Douglas MacArthur tábornok felmentése
1951. 04. 11.

Az ENSZ BT az 1950. június 27-én meghozott 83. számú határozata alapján a világszervezet addigi történetében először lépett fel fegyverrel egy határozatának kikényszerítéséért. Júliusban az ENSZ felkérte az Egyesült Államokat, hogy nevezze ki az egyesített haderők vezetőjét, s felhatalmazta a haderőt, hogy a nemzeti lobogók mellett az ENSZ zászlaját is használja. Néhány nappal később Truman elnök kinevezte Douglas MacArthur tábornokot az egyesített ENSZ-haderő főparancsnokává.

MacArthurt (1880–1964) a West Point katonai akadémia elvégzése (1903) után avatták tisztté, az első világháború alatt Franciaországban harcolt, a második világháború előtti években a Fülöp-szigeteken szolgált, az ottani amerikai csapatok parancsnoka volt, 1941-től az amerikai távol-keleti erők parancsnoka. Majd kiemelkedő szerepet játszott a japán erők megtörésében. A háború után években a Japánt megszálló szövetséges erők főparancsnokaként gyakorlatilag a szigetország irányítója. A koreai háború első háromnegyed évében sikeres parancsoknak bizonyult.

1951 áprilisában Truman elnök bejelentette, hogy MacArthur tábornok helyére Ridgway tábornokot nevezte ki. A személycserének számos oka volt. Bár MacArthur kiváló katona volt, s ezt bizonyítja az incsoni partraszállás is, a koreai háború során sokszor összeütközésbe került az elnökkel. A tábornok számára a cél Koreában az volt, hogy legyőzze a kínai csapatokat a félszigeten, ezért javasolta a Koreában harcoló csapatok megerősítését, Tajvanról kínai csapatok átdobását a kommunista Kínába, Kína blokád alá vételét, illetve ultimátum küldését az országnak, és mandzsúriai célpontok bombázását. Szélsőséges nézeteivel és céljaival túllépte a hatáskörét, s úgy tűnt, hogy nehezen fogadta el a civil kontroll létét.

MacArthur tábornok menesztését kedvezően értékelték a nyugat-európai országok, miután a tábornok sokszor megnehezítette a NATO-n belüli együttműködést is. A kommunista országok is pozitív lépésnek tekintették a parancsnokváltást, úgy értékelték, hogy az új tábornok személye hozzájárul majd a háború lezárásához. A KNDK is üdvözölte MacArthur menesztését, s még áprilisban jegyzéket küldött az ENSZ-nek, amelyben a békés rendezésért szállt síkra, s egy olyan kelet-berlini konferencia összehívását javasolta, amelynek munkájában az öt állandó BT-tag és minden olyan hatalom képviseltetné magát, amelyen valamilyen érdek fűz Koreához.

(A dokumentumot újra közreadja Ignáth Éva)

Forrás: Commager, Henry Steele (szerk.): Documents of American History. Volume II. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice Hall. 1973. 567–569. o.

The Recall of General Douglas MacArthur

April 11, 1951

I want to talk plainly to you tonight about what we are doing in Korea and about our policy in the Far East.

In the simplest terms, what we are doing in Korea is this: We are trying to prevent a third world war.

I think most people in this country recognized that fact last June. And they warmly supported the decision of the Government to help the Republic of Korea against the Communist aggressors. Now, many persons, even some who applauded our decision to defend Korea, have forgotten the basic reason for our action.

It is right for us to be in Korea. It was right last June. It is right today.

I want to remind you why this is true.

The Communists in the Kremlin are engaged in a monstrous conspiracy to stamp out freedom all over the world. If they were to succeed, the United States would be numbered among their principal victims. It must be clear to everyone that the United States cannot – and will not – sit idly by and await foreign conquest. The only question is: When is the best time to meet the threat and how?

The best time to meet the threat is in the beginning. It is easier to put out a fire in the beginning when it is small than after it has become a roaring blaze.

And the best way to meet the threat of aggression is for the peace-loving nations to act together. If they don't act together, they are likely to be picked off, one by one.

This is the basic reason why we joined in creating the United Nations. And since the end of World War II we have been putting that lesson into practice – we have been working with other free nations to check the aggressive designs of the Soviet Union before they can result in a third world war.

That is what we did in Greece, when that nation was threatened by the aggression of international communism.

The attack against Greece could have led to general war. But this country came to the aid of Greece. The United Nations supported Greek resistance. With our help, the determination and efforts of the Greek people defeated the attack on the spot.

Another big Communist threat to peace was the Berlin blockade. That too could have led to war. But again it was settled because free men would not back down in an emergency.

The question we have had to face is whether the Communist plan of conquest can be stopped without general war. Our Government and other countries associated with us in the United Nations believe that the best chance of stopping it without general war is to meet the attack in Korea and defeat it there.

That is what we have been doing. It is a difficult and bitter task. But so far it has been successful. So far, we have prevented World War III. So far, by fighting a limited war in Korea, we have prevented aggression from succeeding and bringing on a general war. And the ability of the whole free world to resist Communist aggression has been greatly improved.

We have taught the enemy a lesson. He has found out that aggression is not cheap or easy. Moreover, men all over the world who want to remain free have been given new courage and new hope. They know now that the champions of freedom can stand up and fight and that they will stand up and fight.

Our resolute stand in Korea is helping the forces of freedom now fighting in Indochina and other countries in that part of the world. It has already slowed down the timetable of conquest.

We do not want to see the conflict in Korea extended. We are trying to prevent a world war – not to start one. The best way to do this is to make plain that we and the other free countries will continue to resist the attack.

But you may ask: Why can't we take other steps to punish the aggressor? Why don't we bomb Manchuria and China itself? Why don't we assist Chinese Nationalist troops to land on the mainland of China?

If we were to do these things we would be running a very grave risk of starting a general war. If that were to happen, we would have brought about the exact situation we are trying to prevent.

If we were to do these things, we would become entangled in a vast conflict on the continent of Asia and our task would become immeasurably more difficult all over the world.

What would suit the ambitions of the Kremlin better than for our military forces to be committed to a full-scale war with Red China?

The course we have been following is the one best calculated to avoid an all-out war. It is the course consistent with our obligation to do all we can to maintain international peace and security. Our experience in Greece and Berlin shows that it is the most effective course of action we can follow.

If the Communist authorities realize that they cannot defeat us in Korea, if they realize it would be foolhardy to widen the hostilities beyond Korea, then they may recognize the folly of continuing their aggression. A peaceful settlement may then be possible. The door is always open.

Then we may achieve a settlement in Korea which will not compromise the principles and purposes of the United Nations.

I have thought long and hard about this question of extending the war in Asia. I have discussed it many times with the ablest military advisers in the country. I believe with all my heart that the course we are following is the best course.

I believe that we must try to limit war to Korea for these vital reasons: to make sure that the precious lives of our fighting men are not wasted; to see that the security of our country and the free world is not needlessly jeopardized; and to prevent a third world war.

A number of events have made it evident that General MacArthur did not agree with that policy. I have therefore considered it essential to relieve General MacArthur so that there would be no doubt or confusion as to the real purpose and aim of our policy.

It was with the deepest personal regret that I found myself compelled to take this action. General MacArthur is one of our greatest military commanders. But the cause of world peace is more important than any individual.

The change in commands in the Far East means no change whatever in the policy of the United States. We will carry on the fight in Korea with vigor and determination in an effort

to bring the war to a speedy and successful conclusion.

The new commander, Lt. Gen. Matthew Ridgway, has already demonstrated that he has the great qualities of military leadership needed for this task.

We are ready, at any time, to negotiate for a restoration of peace in the area. But we will not engage in appeasement. We are only interested in real peace.

Real peace can be achieved through a settlement based on the following factors:

One: the fighting must stop.

Two: concrete steps must be taken to insure that the fighting will not break out again.

Three: there must be an end to the aggression.

A settlement founded upon these elements would open the way for the unification of Korea and the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

In the meantime, I want to be clear about our military objective. We are fighting to resist an outrageous aggression in Korea. We are trying to keep the Korean conflict from spreading to other areas. But at the same time we must conduct our military activities so as to insure the security of our forces.

This is essential if they are to continue the fight until the enemy abandons its ruthless attempt to destroy the Republic of Korea.

That is our military objective – to repel attack and to restore peace.

In the hard fighting in Korea, we are proving that collective action among nations is not only a high principle, but a workable means of resisting aggression. Defeat of aggression in Korea may be the turning point in the world's search for a practical way of achieving peace and security.

The struggle of the United Nations in Korea is a struggle for peace.

The free nations have united their strength in an effort to prevent a third world war.

That war can come if the Communist rulers want it to come. But this Nation and its allies will not be responsible for its coming.

We do not want to widen the conflict. We will use every effort to prevent that disaster. And in so doing we know that we are following the great principles of peace, freedom, and justice.

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